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Despite the importance of peer firm information in capital markets, we know little 
about what peer firms say about each other in financial disclosures. This paper 
provides evidence on this topic and documents that approximately 17 percent of 
earnings conference calls contain at least one peer firm mention from managers. I 
also find that managers are, on average, more likely to mention peer firms with 
superior performance. This tendency, however, is less pronounced around upward 
perception events. Finally, I provide evidence that capital market participants find 
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People use information about peer firms to make a variety of decisions in capital 
markets. For example, managers observe peers to shape their financial and 
strategic decisions (e.g., Badertscher, Shroff, & White, 2013; Francis, Hasan, 
Mani, & Ye, 2016; Leary & Roberts, 2014). Financial analysts, investment 
bankers, and equity investors employ peer valuation multiples to assist in their 
equity valuations of firms (e.g., Bhojraj & Lee, 2002; De Franco, Hope, & 
Larocque, 2015; Vismara, Signori, & Paleari, 2015). And boards of directors use 
peers to determine the amount of compensation to pay their executives (e.g., 
Faulkender & Yang, 2010; Gong, Li, & Shin, 2011). Despite this importance of 
peer information, we know little about one aspect of it: what peer firms say about 
each other in financial disclosures. 
In this paper, I provide preliminary evidence on this topic by examining 
peer mentions within earnings conference calls. In this setting, managers provide 
detail about their announced quarterly earnings and their prospects and in doing 
so may discuss peer firms.1 As an example, the management of Sprint in their 
fourth quarter of 2014 conference call stated the following about their peers:  
I watch the acts of my competitors, and I find it amusing that T 
Mobile claims the fastest network, that AT&T claims the strongest 
LTE signal or that Verizon claims the most reliable network 
 
1 I examine earnings conference calls rather than earnings announcements because there is often 
more industry related information in the former (e.g., Brochet, Kolev, & Lerman, 2018).  
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making you think they have twice the coverage, this just further 
clouds the consumers perception of network experiences. (Seeking 
Alpha, 2015) 
The above quote and others like it raise two broad questions which I explore in 
this paper.2 Are managers more likely to mention some types of peer firms over 
others? And are managers’ comments about peer firms informative? 
For the first question, I specifically examine whether managers are more 
likely to mention better or worse performing peer firms. To provide insight into 
this issue, I adapt a framework from social comparison theory. This framework 
provides competing motives as to why managers may compare themselves against 
better or worse performing peers (e.g., Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; Helgeson & 
Mickelson, 1995; Wood, 1989). On the one hand, the “self-improvement” motive 
predicts that managers are more likely to mention better performing peers (e.g., 
Collins, 1996, 2000; Wheeler, 1966); managers may minimize the differences 
between themselves and better performing peers in order to convey that they are 
or will soon be performing as well as these peers. On the other hand, the “self-
enhancement” motive predicts that managers are more likely to mention worse 
performing peers (e.g., Wills, 1981); managers may highlight the differences 
between themselves and worse performing peers in order to present their own 
historical or expected performance in a favorable light. Given these competing 
 
2 See Appendix A for more example quotes. 
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motives, it is not clear ex-ante whether managers, on average, are more likely to 
mention better or worse performing peers. 
As for the second research question, I specifically investigate whether 
managers’ comments about peer firms elicit significant reactions from peer firm 
equity investors. While focal firm disclosures are often informative about peer 
firm prospects as established in the information transfer literature (e.g., Foster, 
1981; Kim, Lacina, & Park, 2008; Ramnath, 2002), it is not clear whether explicit 
mentions of peer firms contain any incremental information. While peer mentions 
may contain incremental information given the industry-expertise of focal firm 
managers, they may also contain no information because the mentions are value-
neutral in nature, contain stale news, or consist of cheap talk. 
To answer the two research questions empirically, I gather a sample of 37,380 
earnings conference calls from 2,859 firms over the period 2007 to 2018. For each 
firm hosting a conference call for a specific quarter, I define their peer firms as 
those firms that are sufficiently similar to them using the Text-based Network 
Industry Classifications from Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016). I employ two 
approaches to identify peer firm mentions within a conference call: a keyword 
search approach using cleaned and shortened CRSP historical company names 
and a supervised machine learning technique called named entity recognition. 
After combining the two approaches, I document that at least one peer firm is first 
mentioned by management in 17 percent of earnings conference calls.  
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I next find that managers are, on average, more likely to mention better 
performing peer firms where performance is measured using a price-to-book ratio, 
a return on assets (ROA) ratio, or prior quarter stock returns. In terms of 
economic significance, a better performing peer is approximately three percentage 
points more likely to be mentioned than a worse performing peer – a figure that 
corresponds to an approximate six percent increase on the base probability of 
being mentioned. While these findings are consistent with the self-improvement 
motive, they are somewhat surprising given the conclusions of prior accounting 
papers – namely that managers often present their own performance in a favorable 
light by choosing low performance benchmarks (e.g., Cassar, 2001; Lewellen, 
Park, & Ro, 1996; Schrand & Walther, 2000).  
Therefore, I check the robustness of my findings. First, the findings hold if I 
re-run the analysis on a subsample of peer mentions in which the peer firm is first 
mentioned by management in the management discussion section (as opposed to 
either section) of the conference call; this robustness test alleviates the concern 
that managers only mention better performing peers because they are prompted by 
analysts to do so. Second, the findings would be less surprising if they are driven 
by managers discussing the better performance of non-competitor peer firms (i.e., 
pure customers, partners, and suppliers); managers could explain that such strong 
performance benefits them too. The results in a competitor mention subsample 
are, however, similar to not only the main findings but those in a non-competitor 
mention subsample, providing evidence against this alternative explanation. 
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Third, managers may merely mention the most visible peer firms who also happen 
to be strong performers (i.e., peer firm visibility may be an omitted correlated 
variable). After further controlling for peer firm visibility, however, the results 
again show a tendency towards mentioning better performing peers.  
As an additional analysis, I examine whether managers continue to favor the 
mentioning of better performing peer firms around upward perception events. 
Around such events, managers may be more tempted to present their own 
performance in a favorable light by comparing themselves with worse performing 
peer firms. The results only somewhat support this idea though: managers still 
have a dominant – but less pronounced – tendency towards mentioning better 
performing peers in times of upward perception. 
To answer the second research question, I investigate whether peer firm equity 
investors react to peer firm mentions by management. Using two-day absolute 
cumulative abnormal returns around focal firms’ earnings conference calls, I 
document that peer mentions in general elicit significant reactions from peer firm 
investors. I also find that mentions involving worse performing peers evoke larger 
stock price reactions than no mentions and those mentions involving better 
performing peers. As for economic significance, a mention (worse peer 
performance mention) on average changes the market capitalization of the 
average peer firm by 13 (31) million U.S. dollars. These results are robust to the 
employment of an alternative control sample that addresses the concern that the 
group of mentioned peer firms may have had larger absolute cumulative abnormal 
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returns even in the absence of being mentioned. I also show that the results are 
unlikely to be caused by analysts initiating the release of information and are 
unlikely to be due to differences in stock return correlations (with focal firms) for 
mentioned and unmentioned peers firms.  
The above results contribute to the disclosure literature by analyzing a new 
form of disclosure, namely “peer disclosure”. Prior literature has largely focused 
on “self disclosure” –disclosing information about your own performance and 
prospects – rather than “peer disclosure” – disclosing information about the 
performance and prospects of other firms.3 In this study, I provide initial evidence 
on peer disclosure by documenting which types of peer firms are most likely to be 
mentioned and by showing that peer disclosure is a useful source of information 
for capital market participants.4 These contributions complement those of Cao, 
Fang, and Lei (2019) who focus on a different aspect of peer disclosure: firms 
using social media to disseminate bad news about their peer firms. 
  As mentioned above, my findings contrast those of prior accounting papers 
on performance benchmarks. Prior studies show that managers bias their 
performance benchmarks downwards rather than upwards – whether it be 
choosing a worse performing peer group when disclosing relative share price 
 
3 For literature reviews on self disclosure, see Healy and Palepu (2001) and Beyer, Cohen, Lys, 
and Walther (2010). 
4 In one table, Jennings, Lee, and Matsumoto (2017) also analyze peer mentions in earnings 
conference calls, but their focus is different from mine. They find that managers and analysts are 
more likely to mention peer firms that are geographically close to the focal firm; the explanation 
being that managers are more knowledgeable about other firms in the same geographic area and 
that analysts prefer nearby firms to reduce their costs of gathering and analyzing information.  
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performance (e.g., Cassar, 2001; Lewellen et al., 1996) or choosing the lowest 
prior-period earnings number when announcing current earnings (e.g., Schrand & 
Walther, 2000). I bring the “self-improvement” motive to the accounting literature 
and show that managers in an earnings conference call setting appear to favor 
better performing peer benchmarks, a preference which is supported in non-
business research settings (e.g., Collins, 1996; Gerber, Wheeler, & Suls, 2018). 
The direction of comparison is important because upwards comparisons (i.e., 
performance-aspiration gaps) motivate managerial learning and affect firm 
policies as shown in the performance feedback theory literature (e.g., Cyert & 
March, 1963; Greve & Gaba, 2017).   
I also contribute to the information transfer literature. Several papers have 
empirically examined information transfer in capital markets. For example, 
researchers have focused on the information transfers from earnings 
announcements and conference calls (e.g., Brochet et al., 2018; Foster, 1981; 
Ramnath, 2002), management earnings forecasts (e.g., Baginski, 1987; Han, 
Wild, & Ramesh, 1989; Pyo & Lustgarten, 1990; Kim et al., 2008), or other 
disclosure events (see Hope and Zhao (2018) for an overview). While these 
studies conclude that investors of peer firms react to material information released 
by focal firms, it is less clear whether peer mentions contain incremental 
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information.5 This paper suggests that management’s comments about peer firms 
are a useful source of information for peer firm investors.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I discuss the 
related literature and state my two research questions. Section 3 describes the 
construction of the peer mentions database, while section 4 describes the research 
design and presents the results. In section 5, I provide concluding remarks. 
 
2  Literature and Research Questions 
 
2.1 Are Managers More Likely to Mention Better or Worse Performing 
Peers? 
Social comparison theory provides a useful framework for thinking about the 
types of peers people compare themselves against. The theory originates from 
social psychology research and identifies two relevant motives for making up-
down comparisons with others: “self-enhancement” and “self-improvement”, 
which lead to downward and upward comparisons respectively (e.g., Gibbons & 
Buunk, 1999; Helgeson & Mickelson, 1995; Wood, 1989).  
2.1A The Self-Enhancement Motive and Downward Comparisons 
If the self-enhancement motive dominates, people are predicted to 
compare themselves with worse performing peers. Wills (1981) argues that these 
 
5 Brochet et al. (2018) also find that peer mentions in earnings conference calls affect peer firm 
stock prices. Their analysis, however, is only a small part of their paper which focuses on the 




comparisons are most likely when self-esteem is threatened. However, in my 
setting, there may be another reason why such comparisons occur. Managers may 
strategically mention worse performing peers to report their own firm 
performance in a favorable light.  
 Such strategic use of performance benchmarks has been found in other 
disclosure settings. For example, Lewellen et al. (1996) analyze the choice of 
industry and broader market indices chosen by management to compare their own 
stock performance against in corporate proxy statements; and find that both 
indices are biased downwards so that managements’ own relative performance is 
overstated. Cassar (2001) reports similar findings using Australian (instead of 
U.S.) firms. Focusing instead on the strategic use of earnings number benchmarks 
in earnings announcements, Schrand and Walther (2000) find that managers 
choose the lowest prior-period comparative number to highlight the most 
favorable change in earnings. If similar strategic behavior also dominates in my 
setting, then I would expect managers to systematically compare themselves to 
worse performing peers.  
2.1B The Self-Improvement Motive and Upward Comparisons 
The comparer, however, may care the most about the self-improvement 
motive. In this case, the subject compares their own performance with that of a 
peer who outperforms them, elevating the comparer’s self-esteem by making 
them believe that they are in the same category as the superior peer and 
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motivating them to perform better in order to assimilate to the superior peer (e.g., 
Collins, 1996, 2000; Wheeler, 1966).  
To make these ideas more concrete, Collins (1996) asks the reader to 
imagine a researcher with 10 publications comparing herself to a peer with 12 
publications (holding constant the quality of the publications). Under the self-
improvement motive, the researcher with 10 publications likely minimizes the 
significance of the two extra publications and places herself in the same ability 
group as the higher-achieving peer. The researcher’s self-assessment is therefore 
enhanced because through this comparison she has changed her self-evaluation 
from someone with 10 publications to someone with “10 or 12” publications. The 
researcher may also realize that publishing two more publications is attainable 
given that a similar peer has already done so.  
In experimental and field studies outside of business contexts, there is 
support for the self-improvement motive (i.e., upwards comparisons) dominating 
the self-enhancement motive (i.e., downwards comparisons). For example, in their 
meta analysis of such studies, Gerber et al. (2018) conclude:  
In upward-downward choice studies, upward comparisons were 
preferred in laboratory settings and were depressed only modestly 
when threat was present. Field settings were associated with less 
clearly defined preferences although downward choices never 
predominated… The addition of a lateral choice to the 
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experimental paradigm reduced the differences between choice 
preferences although upward selections still had the “edge”. (p.6) 
If the self-improvement motive also dominates in my setting, then I would 
expect managers, on average, to compare themselves to better performing peers. 
Managers may minimize differences between themselves and better performing 
peers to convince themselves and outside stakeholders that they are or will soon 
be performing as well as these peers. For example, managers may state that they 
are making similar investments as those peers who are performing well; or that 
they deserve a similar valuation as those peer firms with higher valuations.  
Given the competing motives of self-enhancement and self-improvement 
and the mixed empirical evidence across sections 2.1A and 2.1B, I state the below 
research question in open form: 
Research Question 1: Are managers, on average, more likely to 
mention better or worse performing peer firms in their earnings 
conference calls? 
 
2.2 Are Peer Firm Mentions by Management Informative about Peer 
Firm Prospects?  
The idea that focal firm disclosures are often informative about peer firm 
prospects is well established in the information transfer literature. In fact, the 
information transfer literature around earnings announcements goes back at least 
four decades to Firth (1976) and Foster (1981). The basic premise of information 
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transfer research is that firms have performance-related factors in common, e.g., 
product market conditions, industry economic shocks, production-technology 
advancements, government regulation changes, and so on. Therefore, when 
investors observe how these common factors affect the focal firm, they can 
extrapolate this effect to peer firms which in turn affects peer stock prices. 
 Several papers have empirically examined information transfer in capital 
markets. For example, some papers focus on the information transfers from 
earnings announcements and conference calls (e.g., Brochet et al., 2018; Foster, 
1981; Ramnath, 2002), while others focus on the transfers from management 
earnings forecasts (e.g., Baginski, 1987; Han et al., 1989; Kim et al., 2008; Koo, 
Wu, & Yeung, 2017; Pyo & Lustgarten, 1990) and various other disclosure events 
(e.g., see Hope and Zhao (2018) for an overview). These studies conclude that 
investors of peer firms are likely to react to material information released by focal 
firms. 
 It is not clear, however, whether there is material information associated 
with peer firm mentions. On the one hand, peer mentions may contain new 
information about peer prospects and hence lead to abnormal changes in peer 
stock prices. This production of new information seems plausible given the 
industry-expertise of focal firm managers – for example, Hutton, Lee, and Shu 
(2012) conclude that managers have comparable industry knowledge to that of 
analysts. On the other hand, peer mentions may contain no new information 
because the mentions are value-neutral in nature, contain stale news, or consist of 
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cheap talk. In this case, peer investors will not react to peer mentions. Given these 
competing reasons, I state my second research question in open form: 
Research Question 2: Do peer firm mentions by management, on 
average, elicit significant reactions from peer firm investors? 
 
3 Database of Peer Firm Mentions 
 
3.1  Earnings Conference Call Transcripts  
I receive a sample of conference call transcripts from Seeking Alpha. 6  The 
coverage across companies is broad with Seeking Alpha stating on their website 
that the “depth and breadth of our content is unmatched, with 8,600+ tickers 
covered and 8,000 articles and earnings transcripts published every month” 
(Seeking Alpha, n.d.). The time period is also broad – any transcripts published 
on Seeking Alpha’s website between January 2007 and April 2018.7 The format 
of a transcript usually consists of a header section, a management discussion 
section, and a Q&A section. In the header section, Seeking Alpha often provides 
information about the conference call – the company’s name and ticker as at the 
conference call date, the date of the conference call, the fiscal quarter and year of 
 
6 These transcripts can be found at https://seekingalpha.com/earnings/earnings-call-
transcripts?sector=all. After signing a non-disclosure agreement, Seeking Alpha kindly provided 
all of their transcripts (published on or before 12/21/2018) for no charge. 
7  The initial sample also includes transcripts from 2004, 2005, and 2006 but the coverage in these 
years is limited. So, transcripts from these years get dropped in latter analyzes. Also, the data on 
identifying peer firms (discussed in the next section) only provides data up to the end of 2017, so 
some conference call transcripts from later on in 2018 are also dropped from the analysis. 
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the earnings period, and often the participants on the call (namely the company 
executive names and their job titles, and the names of the financial analysts and 
their firms).   
The initial sample from Seeking Alpha consists of 157,927 transcripts. 
Upon inspection of this sample, however, it is clear that some of these transcripts 
should be dropped. First, I drop any transcripts in which I cannot partition the 
conference call into its three sections. I also require that the management 
discussion section and the Q&A section contain a meaningful amount of text; 8 a 
small amount of text likely signals that the conference call has only been partially 
transcribed. If I cannot extract fiscal quarter information from the header section, 
then I also drop the transcript – the rationale being that such transcripts are 
usually not related to earnings announcements but to other events such as one-off 
announcements or industry conferences. Finally, I remove duplicate transcripts 
and those that cannot be reliably merged with the Compustat and CRSP 
databases. These steps leave a sample of 104,608 transcripts (over 6,053 unique 






8 Specifically, I drop the management discussion (Q&A) section if it contains less than 500 (250) 
words. I remove the copyright disclaimers at the bottom of the transcript before counting the 
words or running any other analysis.  
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3.2 A Set of Peers  
To identify a set of peers for each focal firm at a specific quarter period, I use the 
Text-based Network Industry Classifications (TNIC) from Hoberg and Phillips 
(2010, 2016).9 The definition and advantages of this classification are summarized 
on Hoberg and Phillips’ website:  
These new industry classifications are based on firm pairwise 
similarity scores from text analysis of firm 10K product 
descriptions. Competitors are firm centric with each firm having its 
own distinct set of competitors - analogous to networks or a 
"Facebook" circle of friends. These new industry classifications are 
updated annually and offer more research flexibility, and are also 
more informative, than FIC (fixed industry) classifications such as 
SIC, NAICS, and the 10-K based FIC classifications. (Hoberg & 
Phillips, 2016a) 
I choose the baseline TNIC dataset that is recommended for most research 
projects and is calculated to be as granular as three-digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) codes. In this dataset, the mean (median) number of peers per 
focal firm-year is 374 (412), which is too many for the purposes of this study. So 
to reduce the number of peers, I make two restrictions: the similarity score 
between focal and peer firms must be equal to or higher than 0.0582 (the median 
score in the full dataset); and the maximum number of peers a focal firm can have 
 




is 30 (i.e., if after the first restriction there are still more than 30 peer firms, then 
the 30 with the highest similarity scores are kept). This latter number is guided by 
De Franco et al. (2015) who find that the 99th percentile of the number of peers 
mentioned in an analyst report is 30.  
 I remove any observations where either the focal or peer firm is in the 
financial industry (two-digit SIC codes between 60 and 67). The rationale for 
removal is threefold: financial firms often have different performance measures 
which would complicate identifying superior and inferior performing peers; 
investment banks and brokerage firms are often mentioned in the Q&A section of 
the transcript in reference to the analysts employer which would lead to many 
false positive mentions; and financial firms often have long names that are hard to 
distinguish from one another complicating the identification of which peer is 
mentioned.  
 Finally, as 10-Ks are annual disclosures by firms, the TNIC dataset is 
provided at an annual frequency. To be consistent with the quarterly frequency of 
conference calls, I transform the annual TNIC data to quarterly TNIC data by 
assuming that a focal firm’s set of peers is constant throughout the focal firm’s 
fiscal year. The resulting database of peers is then linked with historical company 







3.3 Peer Mentions 
To identify peer mentions within earnings conference call transcripts, I begin with 
historical company names from CRSP. These names are cleaned in several steps 
so that their form resembles that of names mentioned in conference calls. I first 
remove gaps between any two single letter words (e.g., " A M S HEALTH 
SCIENCES INC” becomes “AMS HEALTH SCIENCES INC”). I then remove 
the word “THE” if it is the first word of the company name. I also expand 
common and unambiguous abbreviations sometimes used by CRSP to shorten 
long names (e.g., “TECHS” becomes “TECHNOLOGIES”, “SVCS” becomes 
“SERVICES”, etc.). From the end of company names, I remove common legal 
suffixes (e.g., “CORP”, “LTD”, “INC”, etc.), state abbreviations (e.g., “DEL”, 
“NV”, “OH”, etc.), single characters, and numerals (e.g., “I”, “II”, “III”, etc.). As 
an example of the former step, “AMS HEALTH SCIENCES INC” becomes 
“AMS HEALTH SCIENCES”.10 
These cleaned names are then shortened using an algorithm; the basic 
premise behind the algorithm is the less common (or more unique) the start of a 
company name is, the shorter the name the algorithm outputs (see Appendix B for 
details). This algorithm aims to strike a balance between shortening company 
 
10 To double-check the validity of the cleaned CRSP company names, I compare them against 
another list of CRSP names that are independently hand-checked in another project (thank you to 
Musa Subasi for sharing this list). After hand-checking any discrepancies between the lists, I 
changed 253 names from my original cleaned CRSP names to those provided by the other prokect. 
I also modified 21 more company names that had typos or had other more familiar short names 
(e.g., “AMAZON.COM” becomes “AMAZON”). 
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names enough to minimize false negative mentions but not so much as to increase 
false positive mentions (e.g., for “DELTA AIR LINES”, the algorithm gives 
“DELTA AIR” rather than “DELTA”). Specifically, the algorithm outputs two 
names for each cleaned CRSP company name: (a) a short version name that has a 
smaller chance of false negatives but a higher chance of false positives; and (b) a 
long version name that is still often shorter than the cleaned CRSP names and has 
a higher chance of false negatives and a lower chance of false positives. As an 
example, the short and long versions of “AMS HEALTH SCIENCES” are 
“AMS” and “AMS HEALTH” respectively. 11  
Using these short and long versions of peer company names, I identify 
peer company mentions with two approaches. The first approach searches through 
the transcript looking for an exact match to the short or long version of the names. 
To count as a mention, the peer name in the transcript has to be proper case (e.g., 
“Apple” rather than “apple” or “APPLE”) or upper case if the original historical 
CRSP name starts with two or more single letter words (e.g., if the original name 
is “A M S HEALTH SCIENCES INC”, then the short name version is “AMS” 
rather than “Ams”). This approach works well provided the name keyword 
assumptions hold. For example, false negatives are possible when the case 
 
11 If two or more peers from the same set of peers have the same short or long version names, I 
expand their short or long names slightly so that the peers could be distinguished from one 
another. When this is not possible or involves large name expansions (and hence likely false 
negative mentions), then these peers are dropped from the sample. When the focal and peer firms 




assumption is wrong (e.g., “eBay” would be missed) or the length of the short or 
long name versions is too long. Another downside of this approach is that some 
names such as “ADAM INC”, “BEST INC”, “NEW YORK & CO INC” with 
short and long versions of “Adam”, “Best”, and “New York” will likely lead to 
false positives.12 
To get around these downsides, I employ a supervised machine learning 
technique called named entity recognition (NER) which classifies named entities 
in text into pre-defined categories like “individuals”, “companies”, “places”, etc. I 
use the NER model from spaCy, which has been pre-trained on the OntoNotes 5 
corpus – this corpus contains text from telephone conversations, newswire, 
newsgroups, broadcast news, broadcast conversation, and weblogs. 13  After 
running the NER model on the conference call transcripts, I get a list of potential 
company names and an associated count of the number of times the name occurs. 
Upon inspection of these lists, I realize that the model is picking up many names 
which are not company names – a downside of using NER models is that they are 
sensitive to the training data set which, in this case, is not earnings conference call 
transcripts. Cleaning these lists involves removing the common incorrect names 
(e.g., “Board of Directors”, “Securities and Exchange Commission”, “General 
Counsel”, etc.), common business abbreviations (e.g., “EPS”, “GAAP”, “Q2”, 
 
12 For five peer names, I notice a high incidence of false positives so increase the length of the 
short or long name.  
13  spaCy is free to use and available from https://spacy.io/usage/linguistic-features. For more 
details about the OntoNotes 5 corpus, see https://catalog.ldc.upenn.edu/LDC2013T19.  
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etc.), other upper case words that do not match any cleaned CRSP historical 
names, focal firm tickers and names, and analyst firm names. The resulting 
cleaned name and count list is then fuzzy matched to the short or long version 
names. 
Next I combine the search and NER approaches to form a final count of 
peer firm mentions. The final count variables take the maximum count from the 
two approaches with the exception that for problematic names, such as “ADAM 
INC”, “BEST INC” and “NEW YORK & CO INC”, it equals the NER count. The 
primary variable I use in this paper is 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, which equals one if 
peer firm j has a positive mention count (either by its short or long name versions) 
in focal firm i’s conference call at quarter t and is first mentioned by focal firm 
managers (as opposed to by analysts), and zero if peer firm j is not mentioned by 
managers or analysts. I require that managers first mention the peer so that it is 
their decision to do so, rather than management responding to an analyst who 
mentions the peer.  
To determine the accuracy of 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 , I manually read 50 
random focal-peer observations where 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 equals one, and 50 
random observations where 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  equals zero. Out of the 100 
observations, hand-checking reveals that 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 should equal one 
45 times and zero 55 times. The proportion of actual positives that are correctly 
identified as such (i.e., the sensitivity of my measure) is 1.00, whereas the 
proportion of actual negatives that are correctly identified as such (i.e., the 
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specificity of my measure) is approximately 0.91.14 The overall proportion of 
correctly classified mentions is 0.95.  
 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics of Peer Mentions 
The final dataset that combines the conference call data, the set of peers 
data, and the peer mention data contains 521,636 focal-quarter-peer observations, 
37,380 focal-quarter observations, and 2,859 (3,768) unique focal (peer) firms. 
The average focal firm hosts a mean (median) of 13 (11) conference calls (or 
quarters) in the sample.  
At the focal-quarter-peer level, the 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  variable equals 
one 7,824 times or in other words a given peer in a given conference call is first 
mentioned by management 1.5 percent of the time. At the focal-quarter level, at 
least one peer firm is first mentioned by management in 6,401 conference calls (or 
17.1 percent of the time). Sometimes more than one peer is mentioned in a 
conference call: two peers are mentioned in 953 conferences calls (2.6 percent of 
the time) and greater than two peers 212 times (0.6 percent of the time). Overall, 
1,374 unique focal firms (48 percent of all focal firms) mention 1,195 unique peer 
firms (32 percent of all peer firms).  
 
14 Another limitation of the 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  variable is that it does not capture peer company 
names that are referenced by their product (e.g., if “iPhone” but not “Apple” is mentioned then 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 would equal zero for the peer firm “Apple”). Thus, the sensitivity score of 
1.00 is overstated.  
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Figure 1 below shows how the mentioning of peer firms varies across 
focal firms. In this figure, the sample of focal firms is restricted to only those 
firms that mention at least one peer firm in the sample period (48 percent of all 
focal firms). Panel A shows that just under half of these focal firms only mention 
one unique peer firm in the sample period, 22 percent mention two unique peers, 
12 percent mention three unique peers, and the remaining 17 percent mention four 
or more unique peers. In Panel B, I show that just under half of the mentioning 
focal firms mention a peer in only one or two of their conference calls. A further 
29 percent of the mentioning focal firms mention peers in three to six conference 
calls and the remaining 22 percent mention peers in more than six conference 
calls. 
If I use the proportion (rather than the number) of conference calls that 
contain peer mentions and further restrict the sample to those focal firms that have 
four or more conference calls in the sample period, there is a similar mentioning 
pattern (not shown in Figure 1). Around 52 percent of these focal firms mention 
peers in 20 or less percent of their conference calls; a further 32 percent of these 
focal firms mention peers in more than 20 and up to and including 50 percent of 
their conference calls; and the remaining focal firms mention peers in more than 






Figure 1: Do Peer Firm Mentions Vary Across Focal Firms? 
This figure shows how peer firm mentions vary across focal firms. The sample of focal 
firms is restricted to only those firms that mention at least one peer firm in the sample 
period (48 percent of all focal firms). Note that peer firms must be first mentioned by 
management. 
Panel A: Number of Unique Peer Firms Mentioned  
 
 





To provide more detail on the characteristics of focal firms mentioning 
peer firms, I present bivariate statistics on those focal-quarters whose conference 
calls contain peer mentions versus those that do not. These statistics are 
exploratory in nature and as a result I use some of the analogous variables to those 
used in section 4.1’s analysis plus two other variables: (a) the number of peers for 
each focal-quarter, and (b) whether the focal firm is announcing a non-negative 
earnings surprise or not (as measured against the mean consensus analysts’ 
forecast). It is also worth noting that there is likely some noise in the classification 
of focal-quarters into those with and without peer mentions because the group of 
peers used in this paper could differ from that used by managers.  
The bivariate statistics are shown in Table 1. Compared to those focal-
quarters without peer mentions, those with peer mentions on average have higher 
price-to-book ratios, ROA ratios, and stock returns measured over (-93, -3) where 
0 is the focal firm’s conference call date. These differences suggest that focal 
firms are, on average, more likely to mention peers when they are performing 
well. It is worth noting, however, that non-negative earnings surprises occur 
slightly more often in those focal-quarters without peer mentions. Table 1 also 
documents that those focal-quarters with peer mentions involve, on average, 
larger focal firms, focal firms with more peer firms, and focal firms whose peer 
firms have closer matches in business operations (as measured by the TNIC 
similarity score averaged across the focal-quarter’s peer firms). Finally, Table 1 
reports that focal firms that report after (as opposed to before) the majority of 
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their peers are, on average, more likely to mention a peer firm but the difference 
in proportions is not large nor statistically significant.  
 
Table 1: Which Focal Firm Characteristics are Associated with Peer 
Mentioning? 
This table displays the bivariate statistics for the focal firm quarters whose earnings 
conference calls contain at least one peer firm mention from managers and those that do 
not. All variables are defined in Appendix C and all continuous variables and 
𝑁𝑈𝑀_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑆 are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. The superscripts *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively and are based on the t-
test for mean differences, the Mann-Whitney test for median or distribution differences, 






























































𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 {0.4227} {0.4186} {0.0041} 
N 6033 28847  
 
Figure 2 below shows how the mentioning of peer firms varies across peer 
firms. In this figure, the sample of peer firms is restricted to only those firms that 
are mentioned at least once by managers in the sample period (32% of all peer 
firms). Panel A shows that just over half of these peer firms are only mentioned 
by one focal firm in the sample period, 19 percent are mentioned by two focal 
firms, 10 percent are mentioned by three focal firms, and the remaining 18 
percent are mentioned by four or more focal firms. In Panel B, I show that just 
under half of the mentioned peer firms get mentioned in only one or two focal 
firm conference calls. A further 26 percent of the mentioned peer firms get 
mentioned in three to six conference calls and the remaining 26 percent get 










Figure 2: Do Peer Firm Mentions Vary Across Peer Firms? 
This figure shows how peer firm mentions vary across peer firms. The sample of peer 
firms is restricted to only those firms that are mentioned at least once in the sample 
period (32 percent of all peer firms). Note that peer firms must be first mentioned by 
management. 
Panel A: Number of Unique Focal Firms that Mention the Peer Firm 
 
 






4  Research Design and Results  
 
4.1 Are Managers More Likely to Mention Better or Worse Performing 
Peers?  
4.1A Main Finding 
To examine whether managers, on average, are more likely to mention better or 
worse performing peer firms, I estimate the following logistic regression: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐵(𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  =  1)
=  ψ(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +  Σ𝛽𝑚𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)   (1). 
In equation (1), 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals one if 
peer j is first mentioned by management in focal firm i’s conference call in 
quarter t, and 0 if peer j is not mentioned by management or analysts in the 
conference call.  
Given that the relative proportion of mentioned versus unmentioned peers 
is highly imbalanced in my sample, the estimated coefficients from logistic 
regressions could be significantly biased and inefficient (Owen, 2007). To 
alleviate this concern, I follow the commonly used under-sampling method to 
randomly remove unselected peer observations when estimating logistic 
regressions (e.g., Chawla, Japkowicz, & Kolcz, 2003). Specifically, for each 
mentioned peer firm, I randomly select another peer firm from the same focal 
firm’s TNIC peer set that is not mentioned by management or analysts in the 
conference call (e.g., if focal firm i in quarter t mentions two peer firms then I 
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randomly pick two unmentioned peer firms from firm i’s quarter t’s set of peers). 
This approach of forming a control group is used in other peer selection research 
(e.g., De Franco et al., 2015; Gong et al., 2011). 
The variable 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is set equal to one if peer firm j’s 
performance minus focal firm i’s performance at quarter t is non-negative, and 
zero otherwise. Performance is either measured as the price-to-book ratio, ROA, 
or stock return measured over (-93, -3) where 0 is the focal firm’s conference call 
date. The price-to-book ratio and ROA variables are measured at the end of the 
focal firm’s fiscal quarter for the focal firm and at the end of the peer firm’s fiscal 
quarter for the peer firm, where the chosen peer fiscal quarter is the most recent 
quarter that focal firm management could observe at the time of the focal firm’s 
conference call.15 
The vector of variables 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 contains several variables. First, I 
control for  relative firm size calculated as the log(peer firm assets) minus 
log(focal firm assets).16 The rationale for controlling for relative firm size is that, 
 
15  The three relative performance dummy variables – 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  , 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  , and 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  – equal one for mentioned 
(unmentioned) peers 52 (47), 55 (45), and 52 (49) percent of the time respectively. As for the size 
of the comparisons, the mean of peer firm j’s performance minus focal firm i’s performance at 
quarter t (winsorized at the 5 percent level) for the mentioned (unmentioned) peer subsamples is 
0.010 (-0.299), 0.011 (-0.035), and 0.011 (-0.002) for the three respective performance measures. 
16 I choose assets (rather than sales or market capitalization) to measure size difference because 
assets is less directly related to recent performance. For example, differences in market 
capitalizations may capture recent stock price performance differences which is an independent 
variable of interest.   
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all else equal, managers are more likely to mention larger peer firms because they 
are likely more economically relevant to them. Second, I add the TNIC similarity 
score which captures the similarity in 10-K product descriptions; the higher the 
score the more similar the business operations between the focal and peer firms, 
and hence the more likely the peer firm will be mentioned. I also control for 
whether the peer has already reported its quarterly earnings (variable equals one) 
or not (variable equals zero) because focal firms may be more likely to comment 
on a peer that has recently announced their results.  I run the regression with 
calendar quarter-year fixed effects, cluster the standard errors by focal firm, and 
winsorize all continuous variables at the 1 and 99 percentiles.  
Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the above 
variables. The mean values of the 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 variables show that 
there is a near even balance between peer firms performing better and worse than 
focal firms in the regression sample. As for the control variables, focal firms are, 
on average, bigger than their peer firms. Finally, the correlations (untabulated) 
among the independent variables are not large (maximum 0.30) which suggests 








Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
Panels A and B display the summary statistics for the variables used in regression 
equations (1) and (2) respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix C and all 
continuous variables and 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇  are winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percentiles.  
 
N Mean Stdev Q1 Median Q3 
Panel A: Variables used in Regression Equation (1) for Table 3 Panel A 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 13664 0.5026 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 13664 0.4982 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 13664 0.5039 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 13664 0.5053 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 13664 -0.0835 2.1931 -1.5027 -0.0714 1.3342 
𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 13664 0.1332 0.1013 0.0767 0.1038 0.1527 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 13664 0.4932 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Panel B: Variables used in Regression Equation (2) for Table 7 Panel A 
𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 9012 0.0232 0.0236 0.0069 0.0158 0.0306 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 9012 0.4966 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 9012 1.3943 2.6330 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 9012 0.2619 0.4397 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
𝑊𝑂𝑅𝑆𝐸_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 9012 0.2347 0.4238 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝐸𝐴_𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 9012 0.0097 0.0238 0.0006 0.0019 0.0060 
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 9012 7.6181 2.0530 6.0550 7.5852 9.2030 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 9012 7.6308 2.1904 5.9964 7.6825 9.1754 
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 9012 4.0852 7.6677 1.4689 2.5332 4.6476 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 9012 3.7045 6.0765 1.4205 2.5016 4.5640 
𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 9012 0.1117 0.0484 0.0740 0.0966 0.1379 





Table 3 presents the estimates from regression equation (1). In Panel A, 
the sample consists of peer firm mentions in which the peer firm is first 
mentioned by management in either section of the conference call. The 
coefficients on the performance difference variables are all positive suggesting 
that managers are more likely to mention those peers with superior performance. 
To get a sense of the economic significance of these effects, I present average 
discrete changes in square brackets; an average discrete change is the change in 
probability of mentioning a peer if a continuous (indicator) independent variable 
changes by one standard deviation (one unit). 17  Averaging across the three 
performance measures, a better performing peer is approximately three percentage 
points more likely to be mentioned than a worse performing peer – a figure that 
corresponds to an approximate six percent increase on the base probability of 
being mentioned.  
As for the control variables in Panel A, larger peer firms and those with 
closer business operations with the focal firm are much more likely to be 
mentioned which is as expected. Managers are more likely to mention those peers 
that have reported their quarterly earnings but the effect is not statistically 
significant. And the goodness of fit for the logit models is around 64 and 65 
percent for the sensitivity and specificity measures respectively. 
 
 
17 Average discrete changes are calculated using the methods of Long and Freese (2014).  
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Table 3: Are Managers More Likely to Mention Better or Worse 
Performing Peers? 
Table 3 presents the results from logistic regression equation (1). In panel A (B), the 
dependent variable equals one if the peer firm is first mentioned by management in either 
(management discussion) section of the conference call, and zero if the peer firm is not 
mentioned by management or analysts. The independent variables of interest equal one if 
the peer firm’s performance is at least as good as the focal firm’s performance, and zero 
otherwise. Performance is measured as the price-to-book ratio, the return on assets ratio, 
or the 90-day prior stock return. The control variables are peer firm minus focal firm size, 
TNIC similarity score, an indicator variable denoting whether the peer firm reported its 
quarterly earnings before (one) or after (zero) the focal firm, and calendar quarter-year 
fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix C. Average discrete changes are 
presented in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered by focal firm and presented in 
parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels respectively.  
Panel A: Management First Mentions Peer Firms in Either Section of the 
Conference Call 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁  𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁  𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁  
        
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.1974***   
 [0.0427***]   
 (0.0525)   
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  0.0901*  
  [0.0196*]  
  (0.0506)  
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡   0.1388*** 
   [0.0300***] 
   (0.0336) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.2821*** 0.2764*** 0.2815*** 
 [0.1312***] [0.1289***] [0.1311***] 
 (0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0175) 
𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 8.0881*** 8.0743*** 8.1263*** 
 [0.1712***] [0.1712***] [0.1721***] 
 (0.7252) (0.7194) (0.7274) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.0739 0.0834 0.0937 
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 [0.0160] [0.0181] [0.0203] 
 (0.0600) (0.0597) (0.0608) 
CONSTANT -1.0403*** -0.9764*** -1.0184*** 
 (0.1371) (0.1340) (0.1295) 
    
    
Observations 13,664 13,664 13,664 
Calendar Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sensitivity, Specificity 0.643, 0.654 0.640, 0.651 0.641, 0.652 
McFadden's R2 0.107 0.106 0.106 
Log Likelihood -8457 -8469 -8465 
Panel B: Management First Mentions Peer Firms in the Discussion Section of 
the Conference Call 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁  𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁  𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁  
        
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.1623***   
 [0.0354***]   
 (0.0599)   
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  0.0761  
  [0.0166]  
  (0.0599)  
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡   0.1407*** 
   [0.0307***] 
   (0.0373) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.2427*** 0.2375*** 0.2416*** 
 [0.1137***] [0.1114***] [0.1132***] 
 (0.0190) (0.0192) (0.0190) 
𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 8.1615*** 8.1407*** 8.1948*** 
 [0.1945***] [0.1943***] [0.1953***] 
 (0.8433) (0.8348) (0.8448) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.0764 0.0848 0.0943 
 [0.0167] [0.0185] [0.0206] 
 (0.0691) (0.0683) (0.0696) 
CONSTANT -0.9694*** -0.9233*** -0.9696*** 
 (0.1412) (0.1406) (0.1336) 
    
Observations 10,206 10,206 10,206 
Calendar Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sensitivity, Specificity 0.622, 0.667 0.617, 0.667 0.620, 0.671 
McFadden's R2 0.103 0.102 0.102 
Log Likelihood -6349 -6355 -6351 
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While the above relative performance findings are consistent with the self-
improvement motive from the social comparison theory literature (e.g., Collins, 
1996; Gerber et al., 2018), the findings are somewhat surprising given the 
conclusions of prior accounting papers – namely that managers often present their 
performance in a favorable light by choosing low performance benchmarks (e.g., 
Cassar, 2001; Lewellen et al., 1996; Schrand & Walther, 2000). Therefore, in the 
next section I examine the robustness of my findings.   
4.1B Additional Analyses and Robustness Issues 
One possible concern with the above findings is that managers are only 
mentioning better performing peers because they are prompted by analysts to do 
so. It is worth re-emphasizing, however, that the above results only use peer 
mentions in which management mentions the peer firm before analysts do. 
Nevertheless, analysts may still initiate the peer mention without explicitly saying 
the peer firm’s name (e.g., analysts may mention “iPhone” rather than “Apple”). 
To address this concern, I re-estimate regression equation (1) using only those 
peer mentions in which the peer firm is first mentioned by management in the 
discussion section of the conference call (i.e., the section before analysts have an 
opportunity to speak in the conference call). The results are shown in Panel B of 
Table 3 and are similar to those in Panel A except that the coefficient on 




Another way analysts may indirectly prompt peer mentions is by revealing 
their questions to managers before the conference call begins – a practice that is 
documented by Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp (2019). Managers may want to 
get in front of these questions to control the message and while doing so mention 
peer firms. While I cannot completely rule out this alternative explanation, I can 
provide evidence against it by re-running regression equation (1) with an 
additional control variable: the number of analysts that cover both the focal and 
peer firms divided by the number of analysts that cover the focal firm (where both 
the numerator and denominator are measured during the respective conference 
call’s fiscal year). The higher this analyst overlap variable the more likely a 
revealed question relates to the respective peer firm. With this extra control 
variable, however, the results (untabulated) are similar to those reported in Table 
3. 
Another potential issue with the results in Table 3 is that the randomly 
chosen control group consists of, by chance, atypically poorly performing firms. 
So as a robustness test, I re-estimate the regressions in Table 3 with two new sets 
of randomly chosen unmentioned peers and find similar results to those reported 
in Table 3. It is also possible that the mentioning of the same peer firm by 
different focal firms may not represent independent observations. So as another 
robustness test, I cluster the standard errors by peer (instead of focal) firm and 
find that although the 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 coefficients lose their statistical 
significance the results remain the same as those reported in Table 3. 
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The results in Table 3 would be less surprising if they are driven by 
managers discussing the better performance of non-competitor peer firms (i.e., 
pure customers, partners, and suppliers); managers could explain that such strong 
performance benefits them too. To provide evidence against this alternative 
explanation, I check whether the results of Table 3 hold for both competitor and 
non-competitor peer mention subsamples. 18 In Panel A of Table 4, I restrict the 
sample of peer mentions to those in which the peer is classified as a competitor 
and re-estimate the regressions in Panel A of Table 3. The results show that a 
better performing competitor is approximately 4.4 percentage points more likely 
to be mentioned than a worse performing peer. 
In Panel B of Table 4, I restrict the sample of peer mentions to those in 
which the peer is classified as a non-competitor and re-estimate the regressions in 
Panel A of Table 3. In this instance, all three performance difference coefficients 
are positive but the ROA one is statistically insignificant now. Using the methods 
of Long and Freese (2014), I compare the sizes of the average discrete changes 
between Panels A and B of Table 4 and find that while the latter are smaller in 
size they not statistically different from the former. Overall, the results in Table 4 
do not support the alternative explanation that the results in Table 3 are driven by 
managers only discussing the better performance of non-competitor peer firms.19 
 
18 Please see Appendix D for the classification of competitor and non-competitor peers. Also note 
that for the competitor (non-competitor) subsample one random control observation is selected 
such that it is not a non-competitor (competitor).  
19 The same conclusion is reached if I re-estimate the regressions of Panel B in Table 3 using the 
competitor and non-competitor mention subsamples.  
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Table 4: Are Managers More Likely to Mention Better or Worse 
Performing Competitor and Non-Competitor Peer Firms? 
Table 4 presents the results from logistic regression equation (1). Panel A (B) restricts the 
sample to competitor (non-competitor) peer mentions and their randomly selected control 
observations. In panel A (B), the dependent variable equals one if the competitor (non-
competitor) firm is first mentioned by management in either section of the conference 
call, and zero if the peer firm is not mentioned by management or analysts. The 
independent variables of interest equal one if the peer firm’s performance is at least as 
good as the focal firm’s performance, and zero otherwise. Performance is measured as 
the price-to-book ratio, the return on assets ratio, or the 90-day prior stock return. The 
control variables are peer firm minus focal firm size, TNIC similarity score, an indicator 
variable denoting whether the peer firm reported its quarterly earnings before (one) or 
after (zero) the focal firm, and calendar quarter-year fixed effects. All variables are 
defined in Appendix C and the classification of peer firm mentions into competitors and 
non-competitors is explained in Appendix D. Average discrete changes are presented in 
square brackets. Standard errors are clustered by focal firm and presented in parentheses. 
The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels 
respectively.   
Panel A: Management First Mentions Competitor Firms in Either Section of 
the Conference Call 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁  𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁  𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁  








 0.1553*  
 
 [0.0309*]  
 
 (0.0832)  
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
  0.2163*** 
 
  [0.0426***] 
 
  (0.0597) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.4135*** 0.4016*** 0.4123*** 
 [0.1829***] [0.1786***] [0.1828***] 
 (0.0281) (0.0286) (0.0284) 
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𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 11.7322*** 11.7269*** 11.8230*** 
 [0.1190***] [0.1193***] [0.1201***] 
 (0.9976) (0.9920) (1.0038) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.1462* 0.1633* 0.1751** 
 [0.0290*] [0.0325*] [0.0348*] 
 (0.0852) (0.0887) (0.0883) 
CONSTANT -1.1693*** -1.0522*** -1.1031*** 
 (0.2254) (0.2067) (0.2078) 
    
    
Observations 5,091 5,091 5,091 
Calendar Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sensitivity, Specificity 0.703, 0.676 0.700, 0.680 0.703, 0.684 
McFadden's R2 0.169 0.167 0.168 
Log Likelihood -2932 -2939 -2936 
 
Panel B: Management First Mentions Non-Competitor Firms in Either Section 
of the Conference Call 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁  𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁  𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁  








 0.0692  
 
 [0.0144]  
 
 (0.1019)  
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
  0.1715*** 
 
  [0.0356***] 
 
  (0.0621) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.2375*** 0.2314*** 0.2362*** 
 [0.1093***] [0.1069***] [0.1089***] 
 (0.0316) (0.0318) (0.0317) 
𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 10.2824*** 10.2605*** 10.3324*** 
 [0.2486***] [0.2488***] [0.2500***] 
 (1.7332) (1.7090) (1.7187) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.1107 0.1274 0.1334 
 [0.0230] [0.0266] [0.0278] 
 (0.1056) (0.1070) (0.1074) 
CONSTANT -0.9675*** -0.8554*** -0.9333*** 
 (0.2567) (0.2486) (0.2414) 
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Observations 3,875 3,875 3,875 
Calendar Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sensitivity, Specificity 0.644, 0.716 0.646, 0.712 0.654, 0.713 
McFadden's R2 0.141 0.138 0.139 
Log Likelihood -2308 -2315 -2312 
 
 Another alternative explanation for the findings in Table 3 is that 
managers are merely mentioning the most visible peer firms who also happen to 
be strong performers (i.e., peer firm visibility may be positively correlated with 
being mentioned and having strong performance and hence may be an omitted 
correlated variable). While I already control at least somewhat for peer firm 
visibility through 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, I add a further control variable – an index of 
peer firm visibility – to regression equation (1). This visibility index variable is 
based on a peer firm’s average rank within its peer group across three measures: 
(a) the number of analysts following the peer firm in the fiscal year of the focal 
firm’s conference call; (b) the number of institutional investors holding the peer 
firm’s shares at the calendar quarter end preceding the focal firm’s conference 
call; and (c) the average monthly share turnover of the peer firm’s stock in the 
fiscal quarter associated with the focal firm’s conference call. 20 , 21  With the 
 
20 The three measures are chosen based on prior literature (e.g., Bushee & Miller, 2012; Drake, 
Jennings, Roulstone, & Thornock, 2017) and on the requirement that they are not directly based 
on firm size or performance (given that these variables are already included in the regression).  
21 To illustrate how the index is calculated, I use the following example. Suppose that focal firm i 
at quarter t has ten peer firms and that peer firm j has the fourth, third, and second highest metrics 
for the three respective measures (a) through (c). Then the visibility index for peer firm j at quarter 
t is calculated as [(6/10) + (7/10) + (8/10)] / 3 =  0.7 (i.e., an average across the three measures of 
the rank divided by the number of peers). It is worth noting that similar results are obtained for 
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inclusion of this peer firm visibility index variable, the results (untabulated) are 
similar to those reported in Table 3 and hence provide evidence against this 
omitted correlated variable explanation. 
I next examine whether managers continue to favor the mentioning of 
better performing peer firms around upward perception events. Around such 
events, managers may be more tempted to present their own performance in a 
favorable light by comparing themselves with worse performing peer firms. To 
investigate this idea, I re-estimate equation (1) on upward and non-upward 
perception subsamples. The upward perception subsample covers those periods in 
which prior research has shown that managers try and manage investor 
perceptions upwards (e.g., Degeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser, 1999; Erickson & 
Wang, 1999; Huang, Teoh, & Zhang, 2013; Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998). 
Following Huang et al. (2013), I define a focal firm as being in an upward 
perception period if any of the following conditions hold: (a) the focal firm’s 
earnings announcement just meets or beats the mean consensus analyst forecast 
(i.e., the focal firm’s consensus analyst forecast error is non-negative and less 
than 0.01); (b) the periods surrounding large stock issuance by the focal firm (i.e., 
the focal firm’s current or future financial year has a level of stock issuance (sstk) 
divided by total assets that is greater than 0.1); and (c) the periods surrounding 
large M&A by the focal firm (i.e., the focal firm’s current or future financial year 
 
this robustness test if I do not average over the three ranks but rather include them as three 
separate control variables; or if I use log(num_analyst_following_peer + 1), 
log(num_institutions_holding_peer + 1), and measure (c) as three separate control variables. 
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has a level of M&A activity (aqc) divided by total assets that is greater than 
0.1).22 Focal periods that meet none of these conditions are defined as non-upward 
perception periods.  
 Table 5 summarizes the results of re-estimating the regressions of Panel A 
in Table 3 for the upward (Panel A) and non-upward perception (Panel B) period 
subsamples. For the upward perception period subsample, the 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  coefficients are positive 
and statistically significant at the five percent level, whereas the 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  coefficient is negative and insignificant. Using the 
methods of Long and Freese (2014), I compare the size of the average discrete 
changes between Panels A and B of Table 5 and find that while the former are 
smaller in size they are only statistically different for the 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  variable. Overall, these results suggest that managers 
still have a dominant – but less pronounced – tendency towards mentioning better 




22 Huang et al. (2013) also examine periods leading up to earnings restatements. I do not consider 
this setting though as there is no easily available data (in my sample period) that distinguishes 
between manipulation (the relevant ones) and innocuous restatements.  
23 I find similar results if I re-estimate the regressions of Panel B in Table 3 using the upward and 
non-upward perception period subsamples; or if I individually examine the three upward 
perception events: just meet or beat earnings announcements, large stock issuances, or large 
M&A.   
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Table 5: Are Managers More Likely to Mention Better or Worse 
Performing Peers Around Upward Perception Events? 
Table 5 presents the results from logistic regression equation (1). Panel A (B) restricts the 
sample to upward (non-upward) perception event periods for the focal firm. The 
dependent variable equals one if the peer firm is first mentioned by management in either 
section of the conference call, and zero if the peer firm is not mentioned by management 
or analysts. The independent variables of interest equal one if the peer firm’s 
performance is at least as good as the focal firm’s performance, and zero otherwise. 
Performance is measured as the price-to-book ratio, the return on assets ratio, or the 90-
day prior stock return. The control variables are peer firm minus focal firm size, TNIC 
similarity score, an indicator variable denoting whether the peer firm reported its 
quarterly earnings before (one) or after (zero) the focal firm, and calendar quarter-year 
fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix C and the classification of focal 
periods into upward and non-upward perception periods is also explained in Appendix C. 
Average discrete changes are presented in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered 
by focal firm and presented in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.   
Panel A: Management’s Mentions of Peer Firms Around Upward Perception 
Periods 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 








 -0.0518  
 
 [-0.0111]  
 
 (0.0645)  
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
  0.1101** 
 
  [0.0236**] 
 
  (0.0497) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.3156*** 0.3178*** 0.3157*** 
 [0.1439***] [0.1450***] [0.1440***] 
 (0.0221) (0.0225) (0.0223) 
𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 7.5607*** 7.5851*** 7.5838*** 
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 [0.1438***] [0.1444***] [0.1443***] 
 (0.6253) (0.6246) (0.6258) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.1368* 0.1576** 0.1466** 
 [0.0295*] [0.0340**] [0.0316*] 
 (0.0734) (0.0733) (0.0745) 
CONSTANT -1.0874*** -0.9948*** -1.0697*** 
 (0.1597) (0.1520) (0.1528) 
    
    
Observations 5,939 5,939 5,939 
Calendar Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sensitivity, Specificity 0.650, 0.654 0.653, 0.656 0.653, 0.655 
McFadden's R2 0.112 0.111 0.111 
Log Likelihood -3657 -3660 -3658 
 
Panel B: Management’s Mentions of Peer Firms Around Non-Upward 
Perception Periods 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 








 0.1999***  
 
 [0.0434***]  
 
 (0.0660)  
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
  0.1656*** 
 
  [0.0358***] 
 
  (0.0478) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.2776*** 0.2684*** 0.2770*** 
 [0.1275***] [0.1235***] [0.1274***] 
 (0.0205) (0.0207) (0.0205) 
𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 9.2847*** 9.2333*** 9.3621*** 
 [0.2042***] [0.2033***] [0.2059***] 
 (1.2328) (1.2192) (1.2337) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.0108 -0.0127 0.0157 
 [-0.0023] [-0.0027] [0.0034] 
 (0.0740) (0.0738) (0.0742) 
CONSTANT -1.0934*** -1.0694*** -1.0822*** 
 (0.1963) (0.1909) (0.1881) 
    
Observations 7,393 7,393 7,393 
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Calendar Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sensitivity, Specificity 0.646, 0.671 0.641, 0.668 0.648, 0.665 
McFadden's R2 0.110 0.110 0.109 
Log Likelihood -4560 -4562 -4564 
 
As a comparison to the analysis in Table 5, I also examine those peer 
mentions that are first mentioned by analysts (rather than managers) for the 
upward and non-upward perception period subsamples. To the extent that the 
results in Table 5 are driven by managers’ incentives and to the extent that 
analysts’ incentives differ from those of managers, I would not expect the same 
pattern of results for managers and analysts. The results for analysts are shown in 
Table 6 and on first inspection the average discrete changes for the three 
performance difference variables are larger in the upward (Panel A) than the non-
upward (Panel B) subsample. Using the methods of Long and Freese (2014), I 
formally compare the differences in average discrete changes and find that the 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 change is statistically different in the upward than the 
non-upward subsample. Overall, these results paint the opposite pattern to those 
seen for managers and provide support for the explanation that managers’ 








Table 6: Are Analysts More Likely to Mention Better or Worse 
Performing Peers Around Upward Perception Events? 
Table 6 presents the results from logistic regression equation (1). Panel A (B) restricts the 
sample to upward (non-upward) perception event periods for the focal firm. The 
dependent variable equals one if the peer firm is first mentioned by analysts in the 
conference call, and zero if the peer firm is not mentioned by management or analysts. 
The independent variables of interest equal one if the peer firm’s performance is at least 
as good as the focal firm’s performance, and zero otherwise. Performance is measured as 
the price-to-book ratio, the return on assets ratio, or the 90-day prior stock return. The 
control variables are peer firm minus focal firm size, TNIC similarity score, an indicator 
variable denoting whether the peer firm reported its quarterly earnings before (one) or 
after (zero) the focal firm, and calendar quarter-year fixed effects. All variables are 
defined in Appendix C and the classification of focal periods into upward and non-
upward perception periods is also explained in Appendix C. Average discrete changes are 
presented in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered by focal firm and presented in 
parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels respectively.   
Panel A: Analysts’ Mentions of Peer Firms Around Upward Perception Periods 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 








 0.3100***  
 
 [0.0606**]  
 
 (0.1196)  
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
  -0.0350 
 
  [-0.0068] 
 
  (0.1186) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.4554*** 0.4360*** 0.4517*** 
 [0.1818***] [0.1746***] [0.1812***] 
 (0.0375) (0.0379) (0.0375) 
𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 11.8060*** 11.9448*** 11.9124*** 
 [0.1047***] [0.1059***] [0.1061***] 
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 (1.4295) (1.4371) (1.4324) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.4380*** 0.4293*** 0.4746*** 
 [0.0864***] [0.0847***] [0.0941***] 
 (0.1347) (0.1354) (0.1356) 
CONSTANT -1.6303*** -1.5823*** -1.5448*** 
 (0.3060) (0.3206) (0.3103) 
    
    
Observations 1,364 1,364 1,364 
Calendar Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sensitivity, Specificity 0.731, 0.701 0.734, 0.700 0.724, 0.704 
McFadden's R2 0.183 0.183 0.180 
Log Likelihood -772.7 -772.4 -775.2 
 
Panel B: Analysts’ Mentions of Peer Firms Around Non-Upward Perception 
Periods 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 








 -0.0531  
 
 [-0.0105]  
 
 (0.1069)  
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
  -0.0567 
 
  [-0.0112] 
 
  (0.0841) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.4621*** 0.4628*** 0.4601*** 
 [0.1778***] [0.1785***] [0.1775***] 
 (0.0325) (0.0330) (0.0323) 
𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 13.1086*** 13.1270*** 13.1335*** 
 [0.1032***] [0.1036***] [0.1036***] 
 (1.6826) (1.6982) (1.6983) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.2597** 0.2885*** 0.2835*** 
 [0.0519**] [0.0579***] [0.0568***] 
 (0.1047) (0.1044) (0.1043) 
CONSTANT -1.3323*** -1.2249*** -1.2162*** 
 (0.2973) (0.3018) (0.3001) 
    
Observations 2,247 2,247 2,247 
Calendar Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Sensitivity, Specificity 0.723, 0.677 0.712, 0.676 0.713, 0.678 
McFadden's R2 0.166 0.164 0.164 
Log Likelihood -1299 -1302 -1301 
 
 
4.2 Are Peer Mentions by Management Informative to Peer Firm Equity 
Investors? 
4.2A Main Finding 
In this section, I shift my focus from the relative performance determinant 
of peer mentions to an important consequence of them: the informativeness of 
peer mentions by management to peer firm equity investors. To examine this 
issue, I estimate the following ordinary least squares regression: 
𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +  Σ𝛽𝑚𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡        (2). 
Equation (2) is estimated over the same sample as that used in section 4.1 with the 
following exceptions. If the mentioned peer firm hosts an earnings conference call 
within three calendar days either side of the focal firm’s earnings conference call, 
then this peer mention observation and its associated control peer observation is 
dropped from the sample. If a control peer firm hosts an earnings conference call 
within three calendar days either side of the focal firm’s earnings conference call, 
then this peer control observation is replaced with another peer control 
observation that does not host an earnings conference call within this window.  
 The dependent variable in equation (2) is peer firm j’s absolute cumulative 
abnormal return measured over (0, +1), where day 0 is the date of focal firm i’s 
earnings conference call. The expected returns are calculated using the market 
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model where beta is calculated over (-255, -3) and requires a minimum of 50 non-
missing return days. The rationale for using absolute returns rather than signed 
ones is because the focal firms could be stating positive or negative information 
about the peer firm. 
 𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is one of four different peer mention variables. The 
first variable is the usual 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  variable that equals one if peer 
firm j is first mentioned by management in focal firm i’s conference call in 
quarter t, and zero if peer firm j is not mentioned by management or analysts in 
the conference call. The second variable, 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡,  is the 
number of times peer firm j is mentioned by management in focal firm i’s 
conference call in quarter t with the caveat that to have a positive count the peer 
firm must be first mentioned by management. The third (fourth) variable, 
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  (𝑊𝑂𝑅𝑆𝐸_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ), equals one if peer firm j is 
better (worse) performing than focal firm i at quarter t and is first mentioned by 
management, and zero if either 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝑆𝐸_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
(𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) equals one or 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 equals zero. Note 
that a better (worse) performing peer has at least two of the following variables 




24  If I instead define better and worse performing peers using each performance measure 
separately, the results are qualitatively similar.  
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The vector of variables 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 contains several variables. First, I 
control for peer and focal firm size. I also control for peer and focal price-to-book 
ratios. The rationale for including these variables is that larger peers and those 
with higher price-to-book ratios are more likely to be mentioned, and firm size 
and market-to-book ratios are often correlated with abnormal returns (Fama & 
French, 1993). I also use the TNIC similarity score which captures the similarity 
in 10-K product descriptions; the higher the score the more similar the businesses 
and hence the more expected information transfer between the two firms. Third, I 
use the absolute size of the focal firm’s earnings surprise to control for the level 
of news contained in the focal firm’s earnings announcement and conference call; 
the larger the news the greater the expected information transfer. I also control for 
whether the peer has reported before the focal firm or not because those that have 
may experience less information transfer (e.g., Ramnath, 2002; Thomas & Zhang, 
2008). Finally, I run the regression with calendar quarter-year fixed effects, 
cluster the standard errors by conference call, and winsorize all continuous 
variables and 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 at the 1 and 99 percentiles. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the above 
variables. The mean (median) of the dependent variable, 𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, is 
approximately 2.3% (1.6%). The mean peer is mentioned approximately 1.4 times 
in a given conference call and of those peers that are mentioned the mean number 
increases to around 2.8 times (untabulated). The mean values of the 
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  and 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝑆𝐸_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  variables show that better 
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performing peer mentions are more often in the sample than worse performing 
peer mentions but the difference is not too lop-sided. Finally, the correlations 
(untabulated) among the control variables are not large (maximum 0.37) which 
suggests that multicollinearity is not a problem. 
Table 7 presents the estimates from regression equation (2). In Panel A, 
the sample consists of peer firm mentions in which the peer firm is first 
mentioned by management in either section of the conference call. In columns 1 
and 2, the coefficients on 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  and 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 are positive and statistically significant at the ten 
and five percent levels respectively. The coefficients are reasonably small in 
magnitude however – a mentioned peer experiences approximately a 0.08 
percentage point larger return which when multiplied by the mean peer firm’s 
market capitalization equals approximately 13 million U.S. dollars. While these 
effects are not that economically large, they are consistent with managers, on 
average, making informative comments about peer firm prospects.  
In column 3, I examine whether peer investors react more when the peer is 
better or worse performing than the focal firm. The results show that worse 
performing peer mentions are more informative than no mentions (with an 
economic magnitude of around 31 million U.S. dollars), whereas the difference 
for better performing peer mentions is not statistically significant. It is also worth 
noting that the coefficient on 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝑆𝐸_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is larger than the coefficient 
on 𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 and the difference is statistically significant at the one 
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percent level. One possible explanation for this finding is that managers from 
better performing firms are more informed (or make more credible comments) 
about the prospects of their peers firms. 
 
Table 7: Are Peer Firm Mentions by Management Informative to Peer 
Firm Equity Investors? 
Table 7 presents the results from ordinary least squares regression equation (2). Panel A 
(B) uses the sample of peer mentions in which the peer firm is first mentioned by 
management in either (management discussion) section of the conference call. The 
dependent variable is the peer firm’s absolute cumulative abnormal return measured over 
(0, +1) where day 0 is the focal firm’s earnings conference call date. The independent 
variables of interest include an indicator variable denoting whether the peer firm is first 
mentioned by management (one) or not mentioned at all (zero); the number of times the 
peer is mentioned by management; and two indicator variables in which the first (second) 
variable denotes whether a better (worse) performing peer is first mentioned by 
management or not. The control variables are focal and peer firm sizes, focal and peer 
firm price-to-book ratios, TNIC similarity score, an indicator variable denoting whether 
the peer firm reported its quarterly earnings before (one) or after (zero) the focal firm, 
and calendar quarter-year fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix C. Standard 
errors are clustered by conference call and presented in parentheses. The superscripts *, 
**, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
Panel A: Management First Mentions Peer Firms in Either Section of the 
Conference Call 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2  𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2  𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2  
        
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.00078*   
 (0.00047)   
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 0.00020**  
 
 (0.00010)  
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
  -0.00032 
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   (0.00057) 
𝑊𝑂𝑅𝑆𝐸_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
  0.00191*** 
 
  (0.00059) 
𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝐸𝐴_𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.04818*** 0.04804*** 0.05071*** 
 (0.01176) (0.01177) (0.01177) 
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00001 -0.00003 -0.00002 
 (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00014) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00281*** -0.00279*** -0.00279*** 
 (0.00014) (0.00013) (0.00014) 
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00005* -0.00005* -0.00007** 
 (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00001 
 (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) 
𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.03117*** 0.03102*** 0.03097*** 
 (0.00527) (0.00527) (0.00526) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00213*** -0.00213*** -0.00196*** 
 (0.00055) (0.00055) (0.00055) 
CONSTANT 0.04275*** 0.04287*** 0.04272*** 
 (0.00327) (0.00326) (0.00330) 
    
Observations 9,012 9,012 9,012 
Calendar Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.143 0.143 0.144 
 
Panel B: Management First Mentions Peer Firms in the Discussion Section of 
the Conference Call 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2  𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2  𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2𝑡 
        
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.00090   
 (0.00056)   
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 0.00025*  
 
 (0.00013)  
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
  -0.00013 
   (0.00068) 
𝑊𝑂𝑅𝑆𝐸_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
  0.00191*** 
 
  (0.00070) 
𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝐸𝐴_𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.04380*** 0.04382*** 0.04609*** 
 (0.01290) (0.01292) (0.01290) 
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00007 -0.00009 -0.00008 
 (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00017) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00294*** -0.00291*** -0.00293*** 
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 (0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00016) 
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00004 
 (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00005 -0.00005 -0.00004 
 (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) 
𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.02721*** 0.02675*** 0.02709*** 
 (0.00586) (0.00587) (0.00586) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00208*** -0.00208*** -0.00192*** 
 (0.00064) (0.00064) (0.00065) 
CONSTANT 0.04620*** 0.04634*** 0.04619*** 
 (0.00401) (0.00400) (0.00406) 
    
Observations 6,570 6,570 6,570 
Calendar Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.147 0.147 0.148 
 
4.2B Additional Analyses and Robustness Issues 
One possible concern with the above findings is that managers are only 
revealing information about peer firms because they are implicitly prompted by 
analysts to do so (i.e., in some sense analysts are the ones initiating the release of 
new information). While I cannot rule out this alternative explanation completely, 
I investigate whether the results in Panel A of Table 7 are similar to those for the 
subsample of peer mentions in which the peer firm is first mentioned by 
management in the discussion section of the conference call. The results of re-
estimating equation (2) on this alternative sample of peer mentions are displayed 
in Panel B of Table 7. The results in Panel B are similar to those displayed in 
Panel A except that the coefficients on 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  and 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 are less precisely estimated.
25  
 
25 The results in Table 7 are also robust to the inclusion of an additional control variable: the 
scaled analyst overlap variable as described in section 4.1B. This variable may be important to the 
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Another potential issue with the analysis in Table 7 is that the group of 
mentioned peer firms may have had larger absolute cumulative abnormal returns 
even if they were not mentioned when compared with the randomly chosen 
control group of unmentioned peer firms. So as a robustness test, I re-estimate the 
regressions in Table 7 with two new sets of randomly chosen unmentioned peer 
firms and find similar results to those reported. I also use a different method to 
choose the unmentioned control sample – instead of randomly picking an 
unmentioned peer from the same set of peers for the given focal firm and quarter, 
I use the sample of unmentioned peer observations for the same focal firm and 
peer firm combination from different quarters. The advantage of this approach is 
that the mentioned and unmentioned groups are more likely to be similar across 
uncontrolled firm-specific dimensions that may affect the amount of information 
transfer (in the absence of a mention); but the disadvantage is that the mentioned 
and unmentioned peer firms are more likely exposed to different sets of 
information from different earnings conference calls.  
Using this new control sample, I re-estimate the regressions in Table 7 but 
no longer control for calendar quarter-year fixed effects in order to keep the 
desired comparisons across quarters. The results are presented in Table 8 and are 
similar to those in Panels A and B of Table 7. Overall, these series of results 
 
extent that analysts may indirectly initiate the release of information about peer firms by revealing 
their questions to managers before the conference call begins (as discussed in section 4.1B); and to 




provide evidence against the alternative explanation that the group of mentioned 
peer firms may have had larger absolute cumulative abnormal returns even in the 
absence of being mentioned.  
 
Table 8: Are Peer Firm Mentions by Management Informative to Peer Firm 
Equity Investors? An Alternative Control Sample 
Table 8 presents the results from ordinary least squares regression equation (2). The 
analysis in this table differs from that of Table 7 by using a different control sample: for 
each mentioned peer firm observation, instead of randomly picking an unmentioned peer 
firm from the same set of peers for the given focal firm and quarter, the analysis in this 
table uses the sample of unmentioned peer observations for the same focal firm and peer 
firm combination from different quarters. The analysis in this table also differs from that 
of Table 7 in that it excludes calendar quarter-year fixed effects in order to keep the 
desired comparisons across quarters. See the notes of Table 7 for other regression details.  
Panel A: Management First Mentions Peer Firms in Either Section of the 
Conference Call 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2  𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2  𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2  
        
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.00055   
 (0.00035)   
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 0.00022**  
 
 (0.00010)  
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
  -0.00012 
   (0.00045) 
𝑊𝑂𝑅𝑆𝐸_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
  0.00129** 
 
  (0.00050) 
𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝐸𝐴_𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.04978*** 0.04968*** 0.05072*** 
 (0.00918) (0.00919) (0.00921) 
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 
 (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00009) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00257*** -0.00257*** -0.00256*** 
 (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) 
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00006** -0.00006** -0.00006** 
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 (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00005 -0.00005 -0.00004 
 (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.02618*** 0.02594*** 0.02613*** 
 (0.00357) (0.00356) (0.00356) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00272*** -0.00271*** -0.00267*** 
 (0.00036) (0.00036) (0.00037) 
CONSTANT 0.04077*** 0.04079*** 0.04071*** 
 (0.00103) (0.00103) (0.00103) 
    
Observations 19,170 19,170 19,170 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0751 0.0753 0.0753 
 
Panel B: Management First Mentions Peer Firms in the Discussion Section of 
the Conference Call 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2  𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2  𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2  
        
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.00084*   
 (0.00043)   
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 0.00027**  
 
 (0.00013)  
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
  0.00013 
   (0.00055) 
𝑊𝑂𝑅𝑆𝐸_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
  0.00159*** 
 
  (0.00061) 
𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝐸𝐴_𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.04387*** 0.04395*** 0.04491*** 
 (0.01010) (0.01012) (0.01012) 
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.00003 0.00002 0.00003 
 (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00011) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00265*** -0.00264*** -0.00264*** 
 (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012) 
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00007* -0.00007* -0.00008** 
 (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00005 
 (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) 
𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.02662*** 0.02630*** 0.02657*** 
 (0.00416) (0.00416) (0.00415) 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.00257*** -0.00257*** -0.00251*** 
 (0.00045) (0.00045) (0.00045) 
CONSTANT 0.04143*** 0.04147*** 0.04136*** 
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 (0.00121) (0.00121) (0.00121) 
    
Observations 13,248 13,248 13,248 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0769 0.0770 0.0771 
 
A related alternative explanation for the findings in Table 7 is that 
mentioned peers in general (rather than because of the mentions) have higher 
stock comovements with focal firms than unmentioned peers do. To provide 
evidence against this explanation, I re-run the regressions in Table 7 with an 
additional control variable: the Pearson correlation coefficient of focal firm and 
peer firm absolute daily returns over (-93, -3) where day 0 is the focal firm’s 
conference call date. The inclusion of this variable, however, leads to similar 
results (untabulated) as those presented in Table 7. 
Finally, it is possible that observations involving the same peer firm are 
not independent in that the same investors are driving the abnormal returns. So as 
a final robustness test, I cluster the standard errors by peer firm (instead of 
conference call) and find similar results to those reported in Tables 7 and 8. 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I investigate what managers say about peer firms in earnings 
conference calls. Specifically, I ask whether managers are more likely to mention 
better or worse performing peer firms? And whether managers’ comments about 
peer firms are informative? Using textual analysis and a supervised machine 
learning approach called named entity recognition, I first document that 
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approximately 17 percent of earnings conference calls contain at least one peer 
firm mention by managers. Somewhat surprisingly, I find that managers are, on 
average, more likely to mention better performing peer firms. This tendency, 
however, is less pronounced around upward perception events. Finally, this paper 
reveals that peer mentions elicit reactions from peer firm investors with mentions 
of worse performing peers drawing out the largest reactions. 
These findings contribute to an emerging literature of peer disclosure in 
which managers discuss other firms. I provide initial evidence on peer disclosure 
by documenting which types of peer firms are most likely to be mentioned and by 
showing that peer disclosure is a useful source of information for capital market 
participants. Further work on peer disclosure could explore the context and 
content of peer mentions in more detail. For example, which other contexts and 













Appendix A: Examples of Peer Mentions in Earnings Conference 
Call Transcripts 
 
Starbuck’s management discussing their Q2 2017 results:  
“First of all, there's no evidence whatsoever that any national company, 
even those companies that are discounting coffee significantly, with 
McDonald's nationally or Dunkin' Donuts in New England, what Panera 
is trying to do, there's no evidence whatsoever that we have, that there is 
anything that they are doing that is affecting us adversely. So I just want 
to get that off the table. The competitive issues question is just a nonevent 
for us.” (Seeking Alpha, 2017) 
 
Ultratech’s management discussing their Q3 2014 results:  
“I think it’s a significant growth area for the company but our 
competition, specifically KLA very strong company, with great technology 
and a great product. We think ours is a little bit better and a better cost of 
ownership.” (Seeking Alpha, 2014) 
 
Cinedigm's management discussing their Q4 2015 results:  
“As you think about Cinedigm, we think it’s fair to compare our growth 
plans to those of Lions Gate in their early small cap days. Like Cinedigm 
that company grew both organically and through M&A activity, 
implementing an innovative and disruptive strategy and transformed itself 








CoStar Group’s management discussing the performance of their business 
Apartments.com in their Q2 2017 results:  
“During the first half of '17, we've delivered twice as many leases as 
Apartment Guide, 5x more leases than ForRent and 5x more leases than 
Zillow. Apartments.com has taken a completely different approach than 
our competitors have.” (Seeking Alpha, 2017a) 
 
Appendix B: Algorithm for Shortening Company Names  
 
This algorithm takes in the cleaned CRSP historical company names and outputs 
shortened names to be used for identifying peer firm mentions in earnings 
conference call transcripts. Below is the list of the major types of input and output 
names used in the algorithm.26 
Type of Input Name Type of Output Name 
Cleaned name contains one word which is 
“somewhat common”*   
(e.g., “NIKE”) 
Short version name: the one word (e.g., 
“NIKE”) 
Long version name: same as short version 
Frequency: 2.3 percent of unique peer names 
Cleaned name contains two or more words in 
which the first word is “somewhat common” 
and the second word is “not that common”**  
(e.g., “EMERGE ENERGY SERVICES”) 
Short version name: the first two words (e.g., 
“EMERGE ENERGY”) 
Long version name: same as short version 
Frequency: 19.3 percent of unique peer names 
Cleaned name contains one or more words in 
which the first word is “uncommon”***  
(e.g., “ORASURE TECHNOLOGIES”) 
Short version name: the first word (e.g., 
“ORASURE”) 
Long version name: the first word plus a 
second word if available (e.g., “ORASURE 
TECHNOLOGIES”) 
Frequency: 67.8 percent of unique peer names 
 
26 I define major cases as consisting of at least 50 unique peer names. There are 11 non-major 




Cleaned name contains two or more words in 
which the first word is “common”**** and 
the second word is “somewhat common” 
(e.g., “ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES”) 
Short version name: the first two words (e.g., 
“ADVANCED MICRO”) 
Long version name: the first two words plus a 
third word if available (e.g., “ADVANCED 
MICRO DEVICES”) 
Frequency: 4.0 percent of unique peer names 
Cleaned name contains two or more words in 
which the first word is “common” and the 
second word is “uncommon” 
(e.g., “BLUE DOLPHIN ENERGY”) 
Short version name: the first two words (e.g., 
“BLUE DOLPHIN”) 
Long version name: same as short version 
Frequency: 1.2 percent of unique peer names 
Cleaned name contains two words in which 
the first and second words are “common”  
(e.g., “AMERICAN SOFTWARE”) 
Short version name: the first two words (e.g., 
“AMERICAN SOFTWARE”) 
Long version name: same as short version 
Frequency: 1.8 percent of unique peer names 
Cleaned name contains three or more words in 
which the first and second words are 
“common” and third word is “ very 
common”***** 
(e.g., “CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 
BOARD”) 
Short version name: the first three words plus 
the fourth word if available (e.g., 
“CORPORATE EXECUTIVE BOARD”) 
Long version name: same as short version 
Frequency: 1.7 percent of unique peer names 
 
Tables notes: 
* A word is “somewhat common” when it is in the set that contains the union of the ten 
thousand most common English words list (https://github.com/first20hours/google-
10000-english), the ten thousand most common 10-K filing words list 
(https://sraf.nd.edu/textual-analysis/resources/#Master%20Dictionary), and the 100 most 
common business abbreviations list (taken selectively from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_business_and_finance_abbreviations) BUT NOT in 
the set that contains the corresponding union of the two one thousand most common word 
lists and the business abbreviations list.  
** A word is “not that common” when it is NOT in the set that contains the union of the 
two one thousand most common word lists and the business abbreviations list. 
*** A word is “uncommon” when it is NOT in the set that contains the union of the two 
ten thousand most common word lists and the business abbreviations list. 
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**** A word is “common” when it is in the set that contains the union of the two one 
thousand most common word lists and the business abbreviations list. 
***** A word is “very common” when it is in the set that contains the union of the two 
two hundred most common word lists and the business abbreviations list. 
 
Appendix C: Variable Definitions  
Variable Definition  
𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝐸𝐴_𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
The absolute value of the earnings surprise of focal firm i 
at quarter t. The earnings surprise is measured as the 
actual earnings minus the most recent mean consensus 
analysts’ forecast preceding the earnings announcement 
all divided by the fiscal quarter end stock price. 
𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐶𝐴𝑅2𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
The absolute value of peer firm j’s cumulative abnormal 
return measured over (0, +1), where day 0 is the date of 
focal firm i’s earnings conference call. The expected 
returns are calculated using the market model where beta 
is calculated over (-255, -3) and requires a minimum of 
50 non-missing return days. 
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
An indicator variable that equals one if a better 
performing peer firm j is first mentioned by management 
in focal firm i’s conference call in quarter t, and zero if 
either 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝑆𝐸_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  equals one or 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  equals zero. A better performing 
peer firm has at least two of the following variables equal 
to one: 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 , 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, and 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡. 
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑁𝑂𝑁_𝑁𝐸𝐺_𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
Equal one if focal firm i’s earnings surprise is non-
negative, and zero if the earnings surprise is negative. The 
earnings surprise is measured as the actual earnings minus 
the most recent mean consensus analysts’ forecast 
preceding the earnings announcement all divided by the 




𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 & 𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑡 
Focal firm i’s price-to-book ratio measured at the end of 
the focal firm’s fiscal quarter. Price-to book ratio is the 
market capitalization divided by the book value of equity.  
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
An indicator variable that equals one if more than 50 
percent of focal firm i’s peer firms report their quarterly 
earnings before the focal firm reports, and zero otherwise. 
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑅𝐸𝑇90𝑖,𝑡 
Focal firm i’s stock return measured over (-93, -3) where 
day 0 is the focal firm’s conference call date. 
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
Focal firm i’s return on assets ratio measured at the end of 
the focal firm’s fiscal quarter. Return on assets ratio is the 
annualized year-to-date income before extraordinary 
items divided by the book value of assets.  
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 & 
𝐹𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
Focal firm i’s log(book value of assets). The book value 
of assets is measured at the end of the focal firm’s fiscal 
quarter.  
𝑁𝑈𝑀_𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 
The number of peers that focal firm i has at quarter t. For 
the selection of the set of peers see section 3.2. 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
An indicator variable that equals one if peer firm j’s 
price-to-book ratio minus focal firm i’s price-to-book 
ratio is non-negative, and zero otherwise. The price-to 
book ratio is the market capitalization divided by the 
book value of equity. The ratios are measured at the end 
of the focal firm’s fiscal quarter for the focal firm and at 
the end of the peer firm’s fiscal quarter for the peer firm, 
where the chosen peer fiscal quarter is the most recent 
quarter that the focal firm management could observe at 
the time of the focal firm’s conference call.  
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
An indicator variable that equals one if peer firm j’s stock 
return minus focal firm i’s stock return is non-negative, 
and zero otherwise. Stock returns are measured over (-93, 
-3) where day 0 is the focal firm’s conference call date. 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
An indicator variable that equals one if peer firm j’s 
return on assets ratio minus focal firm i’s return on assets 
ratio is non-negative, and zero otherwise. The return on 
assets ratio is the annualized year-to-date income before 
65 
 
extraordinary items divided by the book value of assets. 
The ratios are measured at the end of the focal firm’s 
fiscal quarter for the focal firm and at the end of the peer 
firm’s fiscal quarter for the peer firm, where the chosen 
peer fiscal quarter is the most recent quarter that the focal 
firm management could observe at the time of the focal 
firm’s conference call.  
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
An indicator variable that equals one if peer firm j is first 
mentioned by management in focal firm i’s conference 
call in quarter t, and 0 if peer firm j is not mentioned by 
management or analysts in the conference call. 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
The number of times peer firm j is mentioned by 
management in focal firm i’s conference call in quarter t. 
To have a positive count, the peer must be first mentioned 
by management. To have a zero count, the peer must not 
be mentioned either by management or analysts.  
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
Peer firm j’s price-to-book ratio measured at the end of 
the peer firm’s fiscal quarter, where the chosen fiscal 
quarter is the most recent quarter that the focal firm 
management could observe at the time of the focal firm’s 
conference call. The price-to-book ratio is the market 
capitalization divided by the book value of equity.  
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
An indicator variable that equals one if peer firm j 
reported its quarterly earnings before focal firm i, and 
zero otherwise. 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
Peer firm j’s log(book value of assets) measured at the 
end of the peer firm’s fiscal quarter, where the chosen 
fiscal quarter is the most recent quarter that the focal firm 
management could observe at the time of the focal firm’s 
conference call. 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
Peer firm j’s log(book value of assets) minus focal firm 
i’s log(book value of assets). The book value of assets are 
measured at the end of the focal firm’s fiscal quarter for 
the focal firm and at the end of the peer firm’s fiscal 
quarter for the peer firm, where the chosen peer fiscal 
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quarter is the most recent quarter that the focal firm 
management could observe at the time of the focal firm’s 
conference call. 
𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
The score from Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016) who 
analyze firms’ 10-K product descriptions and calculate a 
similarity score based on these descriptions for pairs of 
firms each year. The higher the score the more similar the 
businesses.  
𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡 
The mean 𝑇𝑁𝐼𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 across focal firm i’s peers at 
quarter t. 
𝑈𝑃𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡  & 
𝑁𝑂𝑁_𝑈𝑃𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 
I define a focal firm period as an upward perception 
period if any of the following conditions hold: (a) the 
focal firm’s earnings announcement just meets or beats 
mean consensus analyst forecasts (i.e., the focal firm’s 
consensus analyst forecast error is non-negative and less 
than 0.01); (b) the periods surrounding large stock 
issuance by the focal firm (i.e., the focal firm’s current or 
future financial year has a level of stock issuance (sstk) 
divided by total assets that is greater than 0.1); and (c) the 
periods surrounding large M&A by the focal firm (i.e., 
the focal firm’s current or future financial year has a level 
of M&A activity (aqc) divided by total assets that is 
greater than 0.1). 
Focal firm periods that meet none of these conditions are 
defined as non-upward perception periods. 
𝑊𝑂𝑅𝑆𝐸_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
An indicator variable that equals one if a worse 
performing peer firm j is first mentioned by management 
in focal firm i’s conference call in quarter t, and zero if 
either 𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  equals one or 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  equals zero. A worse performing 
peer firm has at least two of the following variables equal 
to zero: 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝑃2𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 , 





Appendix D: Classifying Peer Firms into Competitors and Non-
Competitors 
To classify peer firms into competitors and non-competitors, I use two existing 
sources: 
1. FactSet’s Revere Supply Chain Relationships dataset, which classifies 
focal-peer relationships into four major categories – competitors, 
customers, partners, and suppliers – and provides the start and end dates of 
these relationships.27 For more information on this dataset please refer to 
Gofman, Segal, and Wu (2018). I clean this dataset by keeping all 
relationships in which the FactSet Entity ID can be easily linked to 
Compustat’s gvkey, by dropping all relationships which span zero days, 
by removing duplicate relationships, and by creating reciprocal 
relationships (e.g., if firm X is a supplier of firm Y, then firm Y is a 
customer of firm X). 
2. Disclosed customers from 10-K filings up to October 2014 which is 
provided by Jean-Noël Barrot on his website 
(http://mitmgmtfaculty.mit.edu/jnbarrot/data/). For this dataset, I create the 
reciprocal relationship and assume the relationship lasts for the fiscal year 
period of the 10-K.  
 
27 More specifically, FactSet provides the dates in which one of their analysts first noticed a 
relationship in public disclosures (the start date) and last noticed a relationship (the end date). As 
the disclosures are often 10-K filings and FactSet’s start date is based on the 10-K filing date, I 
subtract a year from FactSet’s start date (i.e., I assume that the relationship is active throughout the 
10-K’s respective fiscal year).   
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These two existing sources provide relationship data for around 58% of peer 
mention observations (i.e., those observations where 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 equals 
one). To classify more peer mention observations, I create my own categorization 
scheme using the following steps: 
(i) For each earnings conference call transcript containing a peer firm j 
mention by management, I create a text file that contains the paragraph 
surrounding each peer firm j mention. After excluding text files that are 
too short (under 20 words), likely contain a transcription error (i.e., the 
longest word in the text file is over 40 characters and thus likely contains 
several words stuck together without spaces), and those that cannot be 
reliably extracted from the conference call (e.g., sometimes it is not 
possible to identify whether management or analysts are mentioning the 
peer in the Q&A section), I have text files for 87% of peer mention 
observations.  
(ii) I then create a competitor keyword list which contains “compete”, 
“competing”, “competition”, “competitive”, “competitor”, and “rival”; and 
a non-competitor keyword list which contains “client”, “contract”, 
“distribution”, “collaboration”, “collaborator”, “collaborative”, 
“collaborate”, “partnership”, “affiliation”, “alliance”, “joint_venture”, 
“jointly_owned”, “supplier”, and “supply_chain”. 28  The competitor 
keyword list is created by choosing some of the most common and 
 
28 The word “customer” also commonly appears in competitor text files so is not included in the 
non-competitor keyword list. 
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relevant nouns and verbs that appear in a subset of the text files of peers 
already classified as competitors (and not customers, partners, or 
suppliers) by the FactSet classification. The non-competitor keyword list 
is created by choosing some of the most common and relevant nouns and 
verbs that appear in a subset of the text files of peers already classified as 
non-competitors (customers, partners, or suppliers) by the FactSet and 
Barrot classification. These lists are supplemented by other obvious 
relevant keywords that do not appear near the top of these word-frequency 
lists.  
(iii)For each peer mention text file, I count the number of words that are in the 
competitor and non-competitor keyword lists. I then define a peer as a 
“competitor_text” if its text file contains at least one word in the 
competitor keyword list; and a peer as a “non_competitor_text” if its text 
file contains at least two words in the non-competitor list (or is classified 
as a customer or supplier using the Barrot data) and zero words in the 
competitor keyword list; and a peer as unknown classification if the peer 
remains unclassified.  
(iv) I define the final competitor and non-competitor classifications as follows:  
a. I first classify the peer mention observations with FactSet data: if 
FactSet defines the peer as a competitor then it is a competitor; if 
FactSet defines the peer as a customer, partner, and/or supplier but 
not also a competitor then it is a non-competitor.  
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b. I second classify the peer mention observations without FactSet 
data but with a text classification: if my text classification defines 
the peer as a “competitor_text” then it is a competitor; if my text 
classification defines the peer as a “non_competitor_text” then it is 
a non-competitor.29  
(v) This classification scheme classifies 5,222 (or 67% of) peer mention 
observations (i.e., observations where 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 equals one) as 
competitors or non-competitors. Of the 5,222 classified observations, 












29 To get a sense of the accuracy of the text classification scheme, I treat the classifications in part 
a. as the truth and then check them against the “competitor_text” and “non_competitor_text” 
classifications. The sensitivity (specificity) for the “competitor_text” and “non_competitor_text” 
variables is 21% (92%) and 22% (90%) respectively. Thus even though the text classification 
scheme does not classify many peer mention observations into either group it does a good job of 
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